Donald Trump first got involved with the Russian mafia during the ten-billion dollar Bank of New York money laundering scandal, from 1998-1999, when Russian organized crime used accounts at one of America’s oldest banks to move money out of Russia. Federal investigators linked the accounts (specifically those under the company name Benex) to Semion Mogilevich.
It was described as one of the largest money laundering operations in U.S. history at the time. It involved Bank of New York executives- notably Natasha Kagalovsky and Lucy Edwards- who were married to Russian businessmen.
Trump’s properties were frequent targets for the investment of funds by Mogilevich’s top lieutenants during the 1980s and 90s.
Real estate remains a premier vehicle for laundering illicit funds because it offers a unique combination of high value, complexity, and physical permanence.
Here is why the property market is so frequently targeted:
- Large Volume Placement
Most money laundering involves moving small bills into the formal financial system. Real estate allows for “bulk” laundering. Instead of trying to deposit $500,000 in cash at a bank (which triggers every alarm bell in the building), an individual can buy a single luxury condo and move a massive amount of “dirty” value into a “clean” asset in one transaction.
- Price Manipulation (The “Under-the-Table” Gap)
This is a common tactic where the buyer and seller conspire to manipulate the reported price:
Under-valuation: The buyer pays the seller the official “market price” via clean funds, but pays a significant balance “under the table” in dirty cash. When the buyer sells the property later at the true market price, the profit looks like a legitimate capital gain. Over-valuation: Buying a property at an inflated price to move a larger sum of money into the legal system quickly.
- Layering through Shell Companies
Real estate provides a thick veil of anonymity. Criminals often don’t buy property in their own names; they use:
Offshore Shell Companies: Entities registered in jurisdictions with strict secrecy laws. Front Purchases: Using a “straw buyer” (a friend, relative, or associate with a clean record) to put their name on the deed. This makes it incredibly difficult for law enforcement to find the Ultimate Beneficial Owner (UBO).
- The “Refurbishment” Loop
Property allows for secondary laundering through renovations. A criminal buys a “fixer-upper” with clean money, then pays contractors, suppliers, and laborers in illicit cash for upgrades. When the house is sold for a much higher price due to the “renovations,” the dirty cash used for the labor has been converted into clean equity.
- Stability and Appreciation
Unlike crypto (volatile) or luxury cars (depreciating), real estate is a stable store of value. It usually appreciates over time. Not only is the money being “washed,” but it’s often growing, effectively providing a return on investment for the crime committed.
David Bogatin: In 1984, Bogatin—a known associate of Mogilevich—purchased five luxury condos in Trump Tower for $6 million. Trump reportedly attended the closing personally. These apartments were later seized by the government, which alleged they were purchased with money from a massive gasoline tax-fraud scheme.
Vyacheslav “Yaponchik” Ivankov: A Mogilevich-linked mob boss, Ivankov was a resident of Trump Tower in the 1990s. When the FBI finally arrested him in 1995, they found his personal phone book contained the private numbers for the Trump Organization.
The “Lax Regulation” Argument: Critics and investigative journalists (like Craig Unger and Wayne Barrett) have argued that Trump’s willingness to accept all-cash purchases through anonymous shell companies made his buildings a “magnet” for Russian money laundering.
References:
The New York Times (1999): Activity at Bank of New York Linked to Russian Mob Boss
FBI Most Wanted Profile: Semion Mogilevich - FBI “Boss of Bosses”
Just Security: Understanding Trump’s Ties to Semion Mogilevich
The Guardian: Detectives trace Russian mafia’s laundered millions
Now, ask yourself whether the following story sounds familiar:
In the 2024–2025 election cycles, Moldova was a primary target of what international observers call “hybrid warfare” from Russia. They launched a massive, multi-layered operation to tilt the scales through financial bribery, cyber warfare, and a deep-seated social media presence.
- The Kremlin and its proxies targeted the election infrastructure:
Logistical Sabotage: Coordinated hoax bomb threats were called into polling stations in the West (like Italy, Romania, and the UK) to disrupt the Moldovan diaspora vote, which is traditionally pro-European.
- Massive Social Media Presence
Russia and its local proxies (specifically those tied to fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor) built a “fake news” infrastructure that was operational months, if not years, before the vote.
TikTok & Facebook Networks: Researchers identified over 500 fake TikTok accounts and hundreds of “mirror” Facebook pages that used automated bots to flood comment sections and manipulate platform algorithms. These networks reached millions of views within days. Narrative Strategy: The content focused on “fear-mongering,” claiming that joining the EU would drag Moldova into the war in Ukraine or destroy “traditional family values.”
How familiar does this story sound otherwise to what happened in America around the same time?
https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-statement-on-bomb-threats-to-polling-locations
https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/21/politics/election-social-media-misinformation-republicans
Since the late 1990s, Russia has evolved its “active measures” from traditional espionage into a sophisticated playbook of Hybrid Warfare. This strategy combines cyberattacks, economic pressure, disinformation, and occasionally “deniable” military force.
Here is a timeline of key events where Russia utilized methods similar to those seen in Moldova.
The “Color Revolution” Resistance (2003–2005)
In the early 2000s, pro-democracy movements in former Soviet states threatened Moscow’s influence. Russia responded with direct political interference and media manipulation.
Georgia (Rose Revolution, 2003): Russia backed the incumbent, Eduard Shevardnadze, and later fueled separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to destabilize the new pro-Western government. Ukraine (Orange Revolution, 2004): Vladimir Putin personally campaigned for the pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych. When the opposition leader, Viktor Yushchenko, suffered mysterious dioxin poisoning, many pointed to Russian intelligence. Russia also used “political technologists” to stir up divisions between eastern and western Ukraine.
The Cyber Warfare Testing Ground (2007–2008)
Russia began integrating digital sabotage with political pressure.
Estonia (2007): After Estonia moved a Soviet-era war memorial, Russia launched the first major state-sponsored DDoS attack in history. For three weeks, Estonia’s banks, government sites, and media were paralyzed. Georgia (2008): Coinciding with the physical invasion of Georgia, Russia launched a massive cyber campaign to knock out the Georgian government’s communication lines, effectively “blinding” the country as tanks rolled in.
The Modern Playbook: Information Warfare (2014–2017)
Following the “Revolution of Dignity” in Ukraine, Russia refined the use of “troll farms” and social media weaponization.
Ukraine (2014): During the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Donbas, Russia used “Little Green Men” (soldiers without insignia) to maintain deniability, while a massive social media campaign claimed Ukraine was being run by “Nazis.” United States (2016): The Internet Research Agency (IRA) used thousands of fake personas to inflame existing social tensions (e.g., race, immigration). Simultaneously, military intelligence (GRU) hacked the DNC and leaked emails via WikiLeaks to damage Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Montenegro (2016): On the eve of an election, authorities thwarted a Russian-backed coup attempt aimed at assassinating the Prime Minister to prevent the country from joining NATO.
The “African Footprint” (2020–Present)
Russia has pivoted to the Global South, using the Wagner Group (now Africa Corps) to offer “regime protection” in exchange for natural resources.
Mali & Burkina Faso: Following military coups, Russia deployed massive disinformation networks to stoke anti-French sentiment. AI-generated videos and social media bots promoted Russia as a “liberating” alternative to Western partners. Central African Republic: Russia used social media “influencers” and local radio stations to entrench the pro-Russian government and discredit UN peacekeepers.
When the Kremlin seeks to exert control over a neighbor or rival, they often employ a strategy that relies as much on internal subversion as it does on external force. This involves cultivating or identifying local figures—often referred to by terms like “Quislings,” “patsies,” or “proxies”- who are willing to bypass their own country’s sovereignty to facilitate Russian interests.
This “front door” approach is part of a broader doctrine known as Active Measures (Aktivnye Meropriyatiya). Here is how that process typically unfolds:
- Identifying the Vulnerability
The Russian intelligence services (FSB, GRU, and SVR) look for politicians or influential figures with specific traits:
Ideological Alignment: Individuals who share a “Eurasianist” worldview or harbor deep skepticism of Western institutions like NATO and the EU. Personal Ambition: Politicians who feel sidelined by the current establishment and see Russia as a powerful benefactor that can help them seize or maintain power. Coercion (Kompromat): In some cases, figures are “captured” through traditional blackmail or financial dependency, though modern strategies often prefer willing partners who require less management.
- Preparing the Ground
Before a physical or political “takeover,” Russia works to delegitimize the existing government through the collaborator:
Discourse Manipulation: The collaborator echoes Kremlin narratives—for example, claiming the current government is a “puppet of the West” or that the country’s minority rights (especially ethnic Russians) are being violated. Creating a “Request for Intervention”: A common historical tactic is for the collaborator to “invite” Russian assistance. In the 2014 invasion of Crimea and the Donbas, local “leaders” like Viktor Yanukovych (after fleeing) or nascent separatist heads provided a veneer of “legitimacy” by asking for Russian military protection.
- “Opening the Front Door”
Once the crisis reaches a boiling point, the collaborator facilitates the takeover from within:
Institutional Paralyzation: If the individual holds office, they may order security forces to stand down, allow “unmarked” Russian troops (the so-called “Little Green Men”) to occupy key infrastructure, or sabotage the national response to an invasion. The Puppet Administration: Once the previous government is ousted or the territory is occupied, these individuals are installed as the face of the new regime. This allows Russia to claim it is not an “occupier” but a “liberator” supporting a domestic movement.
Notable Historical and Modern Examples
| Target | The “Collaborator” / Group | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Norway (WWII) | Vidkun Quisling | The namesake for the term; he attempted a coup during the Nazi invasion to “save” Norway by collaborating, eventually leading a puppet government. |
| Georgia (1990s) | Various Paramilitary Groups | Supported by the Russian Transcaucasian Military District to oust President Gamsakhurdia after he refused to join the Russian-led CIS. |
| Ukraine (2014) | Viktor Yanukovych / Separatist Leaders | Yanukovych’s “invitation” to Russia for help was used by Putin to justify the deployment of troops into Crimea. |
| Central African Republic | Local Political Elites | Use of the Wagner Group (now Africa Corps) to provide security for leaders in exchange for mineral rights and political alignment. |
The “Patsy” vs. The “Conspirator”
It is important to distinguish between the two:
The Conspirator: Fully aware of the plan, they trade their country’s sovereignty for personal power or wealth. They are active participants in the intelligence operation. The Patsy (Useful Idiot): This person may genuinely believe they are acting in their country’s best interest. They are manipulated through flattery, disinformation, or “friendly” advice from Russian handlers to pursue policies that inadvertently weaken their nation and open the door for Russian influence.
Summary:
A common pattern analysts point to—when talking about how Russia has expanded influence or control without an outright invasion—is what’s sometimes called “entry through the front door.” Instead of forcing their way in, they look for someone inside the target state who can legitimize, enable, or soften the takeover.
Here’s how that typically works, in broad terms:
- Identify a useful insider Russia looks for a domestic political actor who is:
Ambitious, resentful, or power-hungry Marginalized by the existing political system Ideologically aligned (authoritarian, anti-Western, nationalist) Vulnerable to pressure (corruption, legal trouble, financial dependence)
This person doesn’t have to be popular—just positioned well enough to matter.
- Build dependency Support can come in many forms:
- Media amplification (favorable coverage, propaganda, disinformation)
- Financial backing or opaque business deals
- Political legitimacy (meetings, recognition, “peace talks”)
- Security guarantees or covert assistance
Over time, the relationship shifts from cooperation to reliance.
- Reframe collaboration as legality Once the insider gains power—or influence over key institutions—they provide a veneer of legitimacy:
- Inviting “peacekeepers” or foreign troops
- Signing treaties or security agreements
- Calling for “assistance” against alleged internal threats
- Claiming to represent the “true will” of the people
Because the request comes from a recognized authority, the intervention can be framed as lawful rather than aggressive.
- Undermine resistance from within The collaborator helps neutralize opposition by:
- Discrediting rivals as extremists or foreign agents
- Weakening democratic checks (courts, parliament, press)
- Delaying or sabotaging defensive responses
- Creating confusion about who is actually in charge
By the time the public realizes what’s happening, institutional resistance is often already hollowed out.
- Plausible deniability for Moscow This method lets Russia argue:
- “We were invited.”
- “This is an internal political process.”
- “We’re protecting stability or minorities.”
- “The West is interfering, not us.”
That ambiguity slows international response and fractures alliances.
The key advantage A takeover via collaboration is cheaper, quieter, and politically safer than open invasion. It transforms conquest into something that looks like consent—even when it clearly isn’t.
In short, instead of breaking the door down, the strategy is to find someone willing to unlock it—and then claim you were just a guest.
Since the Bank of New York money laundering scandal (1999), the timeline of Donald Trump’s connections and communications with Russia has evolved from business pursuits to intense political scrutiny and, eventually, reported private correspondence during his post-presidency.
Below are the key examples organized by era.
1. Business & Branding (2000–2015)
During this period, the Trump Organization actively sought “Russian money” to support its real estate ventures following Trump’s 1990s bankruptcies.
- Bayrock Group Partnership (2005): Trump partnered with Bayrock Group, a firm led by Soviet-born Tevfik Arif and Felix Sater (a Russian-American with past criminal ties). They attempted to develop a Trump Tower in Moscow and collaborated on the Trump SoHo project in New York.
- The “Maison de L’Amitié” Sale (2008): In the middle of the U.S. housing crisis, Trump sold a Palm Beach estate to Russian fertilizer king Dmitry Rybolovlev for $95 million—more than double what Trump had paid three years earlier.
- Donald Trump Jr.’s 2008 Quote: At a real estate conference, Trump’s eldest son famously stated:
“Russians make up a pretty disproportionate cross-section of a lot of our assets… We see a lot of money pouring in from Russia.”
- Miss Universe in Moscow (2013): Trump brought the pageant to Moscow, hosted by the Agalarov family (Aras and Emin), who have close ties to the Kremlin. During this trip, Trump famously tweeted: “Do you think Putin will be going to the Miss Universe pageant in November in Moscow - if so, will he become my new best friend?”
2. The 2016 Campaign & “Trump Tower Moscow”
As Trump ran for president, his team maintained contact with Russian interests while he publicly stated he had “nothing to do with Russia.”
- The Moscow Project (2015–2016): While campaigning, Trump signed a Letter of Intent to build a Trump Tower in Moscow. Michael Cohen (Trump’s lawyer) later pleaded guilty to lying to Congress about the timeline, revealing that negotiations continued well into June 2016.
- The June 2016 Trump Tower Meeting: Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort met with Russian lawyer Natalia Veselnitskaya after being promised “dirt” on Hillary Clinton as part of a Russian government effort to help the campaign.
- Paul Manafort & Konstantin Kilimnik: The 2020 Senate Intelligence Committee report identified Kilimnik as a “Russian intelligence officer” and noted that campaign chairman Paul Manafort shared internal campaign polling data with him.
- Public Call to Hack (July 2016): At a press conference, Trump said: “Russia, if you’re listening, I hope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing.”
3. The Presidency (2017–2021)
Communications became official but remained controversial due to their lack of transparency.
- The Oval Office Meeting (May 2017): One day after firing FBI Director James Comey, Trump met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in the Oval Office, where he reportedly shared highly classified intelligence.
- The Helsinki Summit (2018): During a joint press conference, Trump famously sided with Putin’s denials of election interference over the findings of his own U.S. intelligence agencies.
- Seized Interpreter Notes: Reports surfaced that Trump went to great lengths to conceal his one-on-one conversations with Putin, at one point seizing his interpreter’s notes after a meeting in Hamburg in 2017.
4. Post-Presidency (2021–Present)
Recent reports suggest that communication between Trump and the Russian government has continued outside of official diplomatic channels.
- Private Calls (Woodward Reporting): In his 2024 book War, journalist Bob Woodward reported that Trump has had as many as seven private phone calls with Vladimir Putin since leaving the White House in 2021.
- COVID-19 Test Machines: Woodward also reported that in 2020, while the U.S. faced a shortage, Trump secretly sent Abbott point-of-care COVID testing machines to Putin for his personal use.
Key Summary Table
| Period | Primary Nature of Tie | Key Figure(s) |
|---|---|---|
| 2000s | Financial/Real Estate | Felix Sater, Bayrock Group |
| 2013 | Branding/Pageantry | Aras & Emin Agalarov |
| 2016 | Political/Election | Paul Manafort, Natalia Veselnitskaya |
| 2017–21 | Diplomatic/Personal | Sergey Lavrov, Vladimir Putin |
| 2021–Now | Private/Informal | Vladimir Putin (reported) |
Here’s one more rendition of the same list:
Below is a comprehensive timeline of publicly reported examples from around the 2016 election through the present day that have been reported in news and official investigations and that relate to Donald Trump, his associates, and documented interactions or communications with people tied to the Russian government, intelligence services, or Kremlin-linked individuals/entities. Many of these were central to U.S. federal investigations (including the Mueller investigation and Senate intelligence inquiries) — though none resulted in a criminal conviction of Donald Trump himself for collusion or conspiracy with the Russian government; investigations found contacts and communications but did not substantiate a coordinated criminal conspiracy. (Business Insider)
📅 Timeline & Key Examples of Trump–Russia Contacts / Communications (2015–Present)
2015 — Early Outreach & Business Proposals
- Trump Tower Moscow outreach – Trump Organization business efforts included plans for Trump Tower in Moscow during the campaign. Michael Cohen and Felix Sater engaged with Russians about the project, and Sater boasted of strong Kremlin contacts to Cohen. (Wikipedia)
2016 — Campaign & Transition Contacts
Campaign communications & invitations
- Invitation to meet Putin — A British publicist suggested to Trump campaign aides in mid-2015 that a Russian pop star could arrange a meeting with Putin. (TIME)
Russian contacts at the campaign level
- Multiple Russian outreach offers — Emails and contacts from Russians offering support or meetings (e.g., Konstantin Sidorkov and Russian social media offers). (TIME)
Trump Tower meeting (June 9, 2016)
- Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, Manafort meeting Russians — At Trump Tower, Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and campaign chair Paul Manafort met with Russian lawyer Natalia Veselnitskaya, arranged through a British intermediary under the promise of politically useful information. (Wikipedia)
Campaign collaborators and intermediaries
- George Papadopoulos contacts Russians — A foreign policy adviser had repeated exchanges with Russians and intermediaries seeking to set up meetings or aide communications between the Trump team and Moscow. (Business Insider)
- Paul Manafort & Konstantin Kilimnik — Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort had repeated communications with Kilimnik, a Ukrainian-Russian political operative with ties to Russian intelligence, including sharing internal polling data. (Wikipedia)
- Jared Kushner & Sergey Kislyak (Russian ambassador) — Kushner had undisclosed calls and meetings with Kislyak in 2016 and proposed a secure communication channel — a request which was monitored and raised security questions. (Wikipedia)
- General campaign outreach documented — U.S. intelligence briefings later described hundreds of campaign contacts between Trump associates and Russian-linked actors around the 2016 election. (Wikipedia)
Late 2016 / Transition Period
- Michael Flynn–Kislyak communications — In December 2016, then-President-elect Trump’s National Security Advisor-designate Michael Flynn had multiple phone calls and texts with Russian Ambassador Kislyak regarding sanctions and a U.N. vote, later leading to Flynn’s resignation after misrepresenting these to U.S. officials. (Wikipedia)
- Kushner and Kislyak secure channel proposal — Draft plans for a secure Trump-Kremlin communications link continued into the transition. (Wikipedia)
2017–2019 — Investigations & Further Disclosures
- Mueller probe timeline reports documented at least 100+ contacts between Trump campaign members and Russian government-linked persons — including meetings, Skype calls, and email exchanges — though the Mueller Report concluded it did not establish criminal conspiracy. (Business Insider)
- Felix Sater testimony & Russia ties — Sater later testified (under subpoena) about his dual roles and interactions involving the Trump organization and Russian business interests; he claimed to have tried to coordinate Kremlin interest in Trump’s U.S. political prospects. (Wikipedia)
- Continued scrutiny of campaign-linked communications emerged from House and Senate inquiries into Russian interference and contacts. (Wikipedia)
Post-2019 & Later Reports
- Epstein emails suggesting Russian engagement — Newly released emails indicated Jeffrey Epstein (a long-time associate of Trump) sought to communicate with Russian officials about giving them insight into Trump ahead of major diplomatic events (e.g., a 2018 Trump-Putin summit). (Politico)
- Ongoing foreign policy actions — In 2025, President Trump publicly endorsed Russian policy goals (e.g., opposing Ukraine’s NATO membership), and engaged in diplomatic contact with Russia’s leadership — examples of communication at the state level that critics say align with Russian strategic interests. (The Guardian)
📌 Context: Bank scandals & financial scrutiny
While you referenced the Bank of New York Mellon money-laundering scandal (a major Russian-linked bank scandal), the publicly documented Russia–Trump contacts have been investigative, political, and diplomatic in nature, not legal findings of money-laundering conspiracy by Trump.
- U.S. lawmakers questioned whether Deutsche Bank’s Russian money-laundering scandals — similar in era to the Bank of New York case — had any intersection with loans made to the Trump family, but no evidence of a covert Trump–Russia laundering scheme has been publicly substantiated. (House Financial Services Democrats)
🧾 What investigations ultimately found
- Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. election to benefit Trump, according to U.S. intelligence and the Mueller Report.
- Numerous contacts occurred between Trump associates and Russian officials, intermediaries, or oligarch-linked figures — documented by U.S. investigations and congressional inquiries.
- No criminal conspiracy conviction was brought against Trump himself for colluding with the Russian government, though multiple Trump associates faced charges for related issues (e.g., lying to investigators about contacts). (Business Insider)
#Trump #therussianmafia #therussiangovernment
Pictured: A young Donald Trump with a young Semion Mogilevich, Russia’s most powerful crimelord.